

Introduction

I first arrived in Jos in November 2010, at the end of one of the worst years in the central Nigerian city, to conduct interviews on the dynamics of communal violence and prevention strategies. Having passed several military checkpoints on the drive from Abuja to Jos, I entered what looked like a war zone, a city with a heavy military presence at all major junctions and near previous areas of fighting. Along main streets and within neighbourhoods, long lines of burned and half-destroyed houses were a testament to the ferocity of the clashes. More than 1,000 people had been killed in Jos and nearby villages in ethno-religious violence around the Christian–Muslim cleavage during that year – a fatality rate commonly associated with the civil war threshold.¹ Most people I met were eager to discuss the conflict situation, trying to make sense of atrocities in the name of religion. They reflected on their everyday struggles in navigating a vibrant city with many ‘no-go areas’ defined by religion. Once my respondents and I had discussed the conflict, one final interview question often caught them by surprise: ‘Do you know of a religiously mixed and vulnerable neighbourhood in Jos where no killings have taken place?’ Respondents started to think out loud, and most named the community of Dadin Kowa, in the south of Jos, a large religiously, ethnically, and socio-economically mixed neighbourhood. However, they had more questions than answers about this place of ‘local peace’. After initial interviews in Dadin Kowa, I was referred to one highly respected community leader, and arrived at his home to meet a middle-aged man who led a local church. Timothy, whose name I have changed to protect his identity, was very confident and articulate. He explained how he decided to actively keep his neighbourhood safe. In January 2010, a Christian militia group from surrounding villages and neighbourhoods approached Dadin Kowa to kill Muslims.

¹ For a detailed discussion of victim estimates, see Chapter 5.

Timothy came out to meet the armed men and persuaded them not to attack. The same men had been involved in heavy fighting with Muslim groups in a nearby market area the previous day, but when Timothy forbade them from entering Dadin Kowa, they returned to their villages without killing. As I listened – at first in disbelief – to Timothy’s account, I came to understand that not permitting an armed group entry into the neighbourhood for killings was only the most dramatic part of laborious, decade-long efforts to prevent fighting in Dadin Kowa. Behind the religious leader who confronted a militia and averted an attack stood a carefully maintained social network that allowed Timothy to speak in the name of Christian men in Dadin Kowa and refuse collaboration with external armed groups.

Previously, in 2009 and 2010, I had conducted research on communal war and non-violence in Ambon, Indonesia. Ambon is the capital of the maritime Maluku Province and the historic Spice Islands. When I arrived seven years after the 2002 Maluku peace agreement, which ended a local ‘religious war’ between the Muslim and Christian populations, the remnants of burned and bullet-ridden houses were still visible in the city centre, standing among newly built and renovated homes and shops. My first respondents were interested in meeting the foreign student but reluctant to discuss the conflict because my questions reopened a matter that many considered closed and dealt with. Several studies of the Maluku conflict had been published by that time. Often respondents’ answers repeated what studies had identified as ‘causes’ of the Maluku conflict, such as long-standing religious tensions and local political and economic competition. These ‘causes’ seemed to lead to more questions than answers. I soon detected what I would call a ‘standard narrative’ of the conflict, often centred on the ‘provocateur theme’. This theme was common in many conflict regions of Indonesia and alleged that political and military elites close to the former dictator General Suharto in the capital, Jakarta, ‘provoked’ the troubles for their own political gain, masterminded them, and ‘directed the local conflict actors like a *dalang*’, the famous Indonesian puppet master.² The perceptions and actions of ordinary people during the three years of communal war in Maluku were remarkably lacking in these accounts. The provocateur theme holds some insights, in that local and national elites – politicians, religious leaders, and military officers –

² See Human Rights Watch 1999; Purdey 2004.

fuelled the conflict either intentionally and in pursuit of political gain, or through incompetence. However, this should not lead us to conclude that elites ‘played’ local people against each other without the latter being actors themselves whose actions impacted the course of war. My efforts to direct conversations beyond this standard narrative to learn more about how ordinary people experienced the conflict situation and responded to a changing war environment first appeared to go nowhere. This changed when I asked my interview partners about the community of Wayame, the only religiously, ethnically, and socio-economically mixed neighbourhood in Ambon not devastated during the local war. Suddenly, the provocateur theme no longer held answers. Respondents tried to explain – often to themselves as much as to me – why community leaders and ordinary people in other mixed and vulnerable areas did not respond to the conflict like the residents of Wayame, and why some instead supported militia groups and facilitated attacks and killings. In these conversations, my respondents and I were able to focus on ordinary people’s perceptions, action and inactions, and the consequences; we discussed *civilian agency* to understand violence and non-violence in communal war.

Puzzles

The study of non-violence or negative cases of armed conflict has offered limited systematic analysis to date. Numerous anthropological, journalistic, and scholarly accounts have demonstrated that while cases of non-violent communities are rare, they do exist within a remarkable range of conflicts.³ For example, during the genocide in Rwanda, in a cluster of communes around Giti, where the mayor was a member of the ruling party but did not carry out orders, organize militias, or start killings, no massacres took place because the mayor calmed people down and resisted violence.⁴ During the civil war in Burundi, one commune escaped killings during the initial war years because civilian leaders persuaded Hutus not to pursue violence against Tutsis.⁵ Accounts such as these exist for a large number of cases, but many

³ Garcia 1997; Nordstrom 1997; Hancock and Mitchell 2007, 2012; Anderson and Wallace 2013; Kaplan 2013, 2017; Barter 2014; Idler, Garrido, and Mouly 2015; Arjona 2016a; Dudouet 2015; Hallward, Masullo, and Mouly 2017; Masullo 2017.

⁴ Janzen 2000; Straus 2006, pp. 85–87. ⁵ Lynch 2014.

lack systematic and comparative analysis. These accounts tend to be descriptive and often refer to so-called islands of peace. Some evoke an image of a closed and self-sustaining community that somewhat miraculously escaped the war dynamics of the region.⁶ The researcher investigating non-violence is faced with the methodological challenge of making sense of a phenomenon that is relatively rare in conflict zones and does not lend itself easily to comparative analysis and generalization. Moreover, accounts of the few known cases tend to be ambiguous, conflicting, and anecdotal. This is not surprising, given the delicate nature of such information in the context of war. Just as narratives of violence are complex and multifaceted, explanations for non-violence require systematic comparative analysis and triangulation.

In recent years, a substantial body of literature has demonstrated that the level and intensity of violence varies within civil wars.⁷ Research suggests that most conflict-prone regions include pockets of non-violence. Stathis Kalyvas' theory of selective violence in civil war, which seeks to explain local-level variation in levels of violence, prominently integrated civilian agency but primarily focused on 'negative' agency in the form of denunciations to armed groups and indirect contributions to violence against other civilians. Kalyvas argued that civilians and armed groups jointly produce violence because civilians provide target-relevant information and denounce others,⁸ thereby 'killing by the tongue'.

By contrast, peace research has documented so-called zones of peace and emphasized 'positive' civilian agency for violence prevention, i.e. civilian resistance to war dynamics and attempts to preserve safe spaces within war zones.⁹ Recent research into non-violent communities in the Columbian civil war by Ana Arjona¹⁰ and Oliver Kaplan¹¹ offered more systematic analyses and valuable insights into civilian self-protection strategies and interaction with armed groups. Both Arjona and Kaplan concluded that institutional capacity of local communities is key because it would allow them to settle their own disputes and enable collective action and resistance against armed groups. Both

⁶ One case study on the Maluku conflict also refers to the only mixed community not devastated by clashes as an 'island of civility'; see Braithwaite 2010.

⁷ Wood 2003b; Kalyvas 2006; Varshney 2007; see also Nordstrom 2007.

⁸ Kalyvas 2006. ⁹ Hancock and Mitchell 2007; Hancock 2017.

¹⁰ Arjona 2016a. ¹¹ Kaplan 2017.

studies further stressed incentives among armed groups to respect civilian preferences, such as broad reliance on civilian collaboration and long-term perspectives to govern a particular territory, as necessary preconditions that allow civilians bargaining power. These recent studies of non-violence in the context of the Colombian civil war substantially illuminate civilian–armed group interaction. However, how such communities and their institutional capacity emerge, and how people preserve non-violence in the context of a changing conflict zone – often over years – which means maintaining institutions for decision-making and social cohesion to repeatedly negotiate with armed groups, remains underexplored. The context of communal war in Ambon and Jos, which this book addresses, also raises further questions. None of my case study communities could rely on a pre-established institutional framework and capacity to resist armed groups. Instead, civilians developed social orders within their communities that would prevent killings in the wake of the outbreak of the conflict, and then continuously adapted prevention strategies within a rapidly changing conflict zone.

During my field research in Ambon and in Jos, I found that one ethnically, religiously, and socio-economically mixed community in each city had remained non-violent. In both cities, each non-violent community was located in the second most violent local district. The non-violent communities of Wayame in Ambon and Dadin Kowa in Jos were both almost contiguous to a similarly mixed community that had equally undertaken violence prevention efforts but was eventually devastated by clashes and thereafter remained religiously segregated.

Unfortunately, the effective prevention work of people in Wayame and Dadin Kowa remained exceptional. As is discussed in further detail in what follows, neighbouring similarly mixed communities that equally tried to prevent killings suffered clashes when external armed groups attacked, with support from some residents of the targeted area against their neighbours. In Jos, only some upper-middle-class mixed areas remained intact while in Ambon, no other mixed community escaped killings and displacement.

Both conflicts escalated quickly from brawls and local fights to killings perpetrated by well-armed mobile gangs and militias, often in coordinated attacks, resulting in large victim numbers and massive displacement. In 2001, the first clashes in Jos killed more than 1,000

people in five days, while the local war in Ambon and tiny Maluku Province cost an estimated 1,460 people their lives in 1999, out of a population of about 1.1 million. At the height of the conflict in Maluku, at least 350,000 people were displaced.¹²

How to explain such conflict escalation? Beyond the puzzle of non-violence, this book analyses civilian mobilization and conflict escalation in *communal war*. Communal war, as I define it, refers to non-state armed conflict between social groups that results in casualty numbers that reach the civil war threshold. As is demonstrated in this volume, much of the violence in communal wars escalates from neighbourhood-based pogroms against the minority population, in which neighbours may kill neighbours, to frontal battles between armed groups, and joint attacks of mobile gangs and militias in coordination with some civilians from targeted areas.

This book investigates local-level violence and non-violence in communal ‘religious’ wars. It develops theoretical frameworks for the study of civilian mobilization and (1) regional conflict escalation to the level of a communal war, and (2) community-based non-escalation and the outcome of non-violence in the context of communal war.

Arguments

Why were people in Wayame and Dadin Kowa able to prevent killings while surrounded by atrocities taking place, when many among their own youths wanted to participate in fighting and external armed groups threatened to attack? In order to theorize non-escalation and prevention, I first clarify assumptions and definitions.

‘Non-violence’ is a term with strong positive connotations, rooted in the conflict resolution literature, where it refers to ‘social change and increased justice through peaceful means’.¹³ Non-violent resistance encompasses ‘an abstention from using physical force to achieve an aim, but also a full engagement in resisting oppression, domination and any other forms of injustice’.¹⁴ The growing body of literature on non-violence warrants further definition of the term. Civil resistance research has defined ‘non-violent resistance’ as ‘the application of

¹² See www.internal-displacement.org/south-and-south-east-asia/indonesia/new-archive/conflict-and-displacement-in-and-from-maluku-and-north-maluku-1999-2004. Last accessed 13 November 2017.

¹³ Lederach 2005, p. 15. ¹⁴ Dudouet 2008, p. 3.

unarmed civilian power using nonviolent methods such as protests, strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations, without using or threatening physical harm against the opponent'.¹⁵ By contrast, I study *non-violence* as an *outcome* – the absence of conflict-related violence in areas located within conflict zones – and as a *process*, i.e. non-escalation. Non-violence does not need to imply pacifist attitudes, a lack of threats to physical violence, or a complete absence of any form of inter-personal violence. On the contrary, as is demonstrated later in this book, non-violence in Wayame in Ambon and Dadin Kowa in Jos was an outcome preserved partly through repression and physical punishments of those who wanted to instigate killings.

Theoretically, non-violence as an outcome can result from geographic factors and/or the strategies of armed groups. Empirically, non-violence is not usually a coincidental by-product of armed conflict but the direct result of civilian self-protection and prevention efforts. Since civilians are mostly viewed as victims of armed conflict, their intrepid mobilization, successful engagement with armed groups, and prevention of killings is counterintuitive and requires explanation.

In a nutshell, I argue that at the onset of conflicts, Wayame and Dadin Kowa were *vulnerable* communities because part of their own youth wanted to mobilize and fight, and external armed groups threatened to attack. Based on continuous prevention efforts, these areas *became resilient communities* that successfully adapted and mitigated their vulnerability, albeit under severe duress, as is demonstrated in what follows. Although prevention efforts were embedded within a specific conflict context, factors such as geography, demography, or a timely intervention by security forces did not predict non-violence. Instead, preventing killings was an adaptive social process contingent on individual leadership and collective agency. Community leaders and residents countered polarization and developed inclusive cross-cleavage identities; established internal social control, persuading residents to support prevention efforts and formulating rules and procedures for conflict management; and engaged external armed groups for negotiations and the gathering and dissemination of information. In so doing, they established social orders different from violence-prone neighbourhoods that came under the influence and control of armed groups.

¹⁵ Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013, p. 271.

I draw on resilience research of communities exposed to climate change and develop a *resilience lens* that focuses on adaptation. Socio-ecological research has pioneered the idea to describe how communities adapt to environmental change and placed emphasis on the significance of generic dynamics of social knowledge and learning, self-organization, anticipation, and imagination that would support community adaptation to adversity. Resilience has also made significant inroads into policy research on armed violence and development. Within the World Bank and other donors, a discourse has emerged on ‘making societies more resilient to violence’ in order to foster social and economic development.¹⁶ Non-violent communities in Ambon and Jos adapted to a rapidly changing conflict environment characterized by the mobilization of vigilantes, criminals, and gangs organized around political actors; deeply polarized ethnic and religious relations; and the formation of militias and a growing militarization of local order. Civilian prevention efforts emerged first through individual leaders who negotiated neutrality within and beyond their communities. Their courageous and high-risk initiatives sparked community-based social movements when ordinary people joined their efforts. Community leaders were guided by *social knowledge* concerning the organization of violence and *lived experience* in other conflict zones prior to the conflicts in Ambon and Jos. Throughout their prevention work, they demonstrated *social learning* with regard to conflict dynamics, imagination of threats and challenges, and continuous *scenario-building* of potential attacks to *anticipate* and mitigate consequences, thus sustaining prevention.

To date, the distinction between causes of conflict onset and causes of violence against civilians, as developed in the civil war literature, has not been fully integrated into communal conflict research. Most studies of communal violence focus on riots as sporadic phenomena of urban violence linked to urban elite politics, and urban bias often prevails in the field.¹⁷ However, communal violence in and around Ambon and Jos took place over several years, driven by interlinking dynamics of urban and rural violence. In Indonesia and Nigeria, almost half of all casualty numbers resulted from rural communal clashes. Riot research

¹⁶ Marc 2009.

¹⁷ See also Kalyvas 2006, pp. 38–48, for a discussion of urban bias in civil war research.

neither analyses urban–rural violence dynamics nor does this body of literature offer convincing explanations for non-violent communities within these conflict zones. Understanding escalation and causes for violence endogenous to conditions at conflict onset¹⁸ is a crucial first step for theorizing non-escalation and factors of restraint.¹⁹ Conceptualizing the conflicts in Maluku Province in Indonesia²⁰ and Plateau State in Nigeria as communal wars allows me to theorize civilian agency as causal for violent and non-violent outcomes in neighbouring communities. This analysis builds on the recent micro-turn in the study of civil war and genocide, which emphasized the complexity and non-linearity of escalation and non-escalation,²¹ and the enduring social legacies of war and violence that impact post-conflict political order.²²

Research Design

At the turn of the century, Indonesia and Nigeria appeared to exemplify an apparent global trend in ‘ethnic’ and ‘religious’ conflicts, with both countries seemingly disintegrating. In 1998, within the course of three weeks, the authoritarian military regimes in Jakarta and Abuja fell, and both countries embarked on a democratization process. In the wake of the transitions, communal conflicts with a strong transnational religious dimension along the Christian–Muslim cleavage ravaged both states and sent shock waves through the regions.

Indonesia and Nigeria have been selected for their similar background factors. Both post-colonial countries are populous, leading regional powers characterized by a high level of ethnic heterogeneity and religious and cultural diversity. My research focuses on two regional conflicts that escalated in the context of regime change and democratization processes, weakened security forces, transnational religious movements, and religious conflict discourses.

The conflict in Ambon, capital of Maluku Province in eastern Indonesia, was one of the worst conflicts during the transition. Between 1999 and 2002, almost 3,000 people were killed in Ambon

¹⁸ Kalyvas 2009. ¹⁹ E.g., Straus 2012.

²⁰ Barron, Azca, and Susdinarjanti 2012 also previously referred to the Maluku conflict as a ‘communal war’.

²¹ Fujii 2009; Kalyvas 2009; Straus 2012. ²² Wood 2008, 2015.

and rural Maluku out of a population of about 1.1 million.²³ In the city of Jos, the capital of Plateau State in central Nigeria, clashes subsequent to a controversial local political appointment transformed into a deadly cycle of killings along the religious divide. In Jos and rural Plateau State, at least 7,000 people died between 2001 and 2016.²⁴ The violence in Ambon escalated when well-organized militias and paramilitary troops launched sophisticated attacks on urban and rural communities. In Jos, a heavy military presence contained escalation before gangs and vigilantes transformed into militias in control of the city. However, in rural areas, well-armed militias continued attacks and atrocities.

While Indonesia's democratic consolidation is widely seen as stable, Nigeria has repeatedly been referred to as 'teetering on the brink of collapse'.²⁵ Since the transitions, political struggles over the place of religion in public life and the formation of religious extremist movements have been an important domestic feature in both countries. The critical junctures of the transitions, the weakening of political institutions and security forces, economic decline, and the general climate of uncertainty resulted in an enabling environment for the escalation of violence both in Ambon and in Jos.²⁶ Both communal conflicts had significant national repercussions; extremist religious groups, such as Laskar Jihad in Indonesia and Boko Haram in Nigeria, directly referred to 'the killing of Muslims' in Ambon and in Jos, respectively, to justify terrorist acts in other parts of the countries.

Table I.1 summarizes my cross-case and within-case paired comparative approach. I studied non-violent communities in a paired comparison to an almost contiguous community that was similarly mixed, where community leaders tried to prevent killings, but devastating clashes eventually took place. Paired comparison is a widely used method distinct from single-case studies and multi-case analysis.²⁷ Also referred to as 'controlled case comparison'²⁸ or 'matching

²³ Estimates based on data from the Indonesia National Violence Monitoring Program; see Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion.

²⁴ Estimates based on my dataset of violent incidents for Plateau State; see Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion.

²⁵ Campbell 2013.

²⁶ How the Indonesian regime change created an enabling environment for the Maluku conflict, and other cases of communal violence in Indonesia, has been discussed at length in Bertrand 2004, Sidel 2006, and van Klinken 2007.

²⁷ Tarrow 2010. ²⁸ Bennett and George 2005.

Table I.1 *Cross-case and within-case paired comparison*

Cross-Case Comparison		Within-Case Comparison	
COUNTRY	PROVINCE/STATE	VIOLENT COMMUNITY	NON-VIOLENT COMMUNITY
Indonesia	Ambon – Maluku	Poka–Rumahtiga	Wayame
Nigeria	Jos – Plateau	Anglo Jos	Dadin Kowa

cases',²⁹ this method supports assessing whether findings derived from an in-depth case study can travel.

Prior to the conflicts, Ambon and Jos had a strong reputation for peaceful coexistence of their almost equal numbers of Muslim and Christian populations. There were no histories of significant clashes despite long-standing tensions between ethnic and religious groups. Consequently, my case selection allows me to exclude potential effects of legacies of previous clashes on the escalation and non-escalation processes that this book analyses.

The material for this book was collected during nine fieldwork stays in Indonesia and Nigeria between the years 2009 and 2015, during which I conducted more than 200 interviews. I visited Ambon four times and conducted a total of 83 interviews with 52 individuals, including community and religious leaders, residents and journalists, non-governmental organization (NGO) representatives and academic colleagues at the local universities, militia leaders and members, and, of course, residents from my case study areas. My repeated visits allowed me to interview key respondents twice or more to probe memories and verify details. In Jos, I conducted a total of 125 interviews with 98 community members and leaders, religious and ethnic group leaders, journalists, NGO workers, politicians, and gang members. My interview respondents came from the worst-affected neighbourhoods in the centre of Jos and my case study communities. My presence in Jos at the end of one of the worst years in a continuing conflict also allowed me to collect valuable ethnographic observations, particularly in the non-violent neighbourhood of Dadin Kowa. These interviews form the evidentiary backbone of this book.

²⁹ Gerring 2007.

In addition, I analysed event data for both conflict regions. For Indonesia, I utilize data collected by the Indonesia National Violence Monitoring System (NVMS).³⁰ For Nigeria, I have collected and verified reporting from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), Human Rights Watch, Nigeria Watch, and information from local community representatives.³¹ My descriptive statistics capture geographical and temporal conflict trends. They demonstrate the spread of militia attacks and their reach, thus providing valuable information on the urban and rural dynamics of violence in communal war.

Why Read This Book

Are individuals who prevent killings driven by moral commitment and inclusive values, or by instrumental motives of self-protection and personal benefit? Can we only expect non-violence if individuals driven by a sense of moral obligations and outstanding courage are present? To what extent can ordinary people and potential bystanders prevent killings, for example because they want to protect themselves and their families? These questions and potential explanations imply different policy approaches to strengthening local prevention efforts in conflict zones. Nascent civil war research on civilian agency suggests that individuals who engage in violence prevention are driven by motives of self-interest and self-protection.³² However, self-protection and fear are also key motivations for joining militias or participate in genocide.³³ Furthermore, genocide research on rescue behaviour during the Holocaust concluded that individuals who performed extraordinary and courageous rescue deeds ‘were ordinary people’ from ‘all walks of life’.³⁴ Consequently, as Oliner and Oliner first formulated in 1988 in their preface for *The Altruistic Personality*, ‘if we can understand some of the attributes that distinguished rescuers from others, perhaps we can deliberately cultivate them.’³⁵ This book is motivated by the concern that the emergence of non-violence and civilian agency and their implications for the protection of civilians overall remain poorly understood.

³⁰ This dataset was compiled by the Indonesian Ministry of Welfare in cooperation with the World Bank: www.snpc-indonesia.com/

³¹ See Chapter 5 for more details. ³² Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013.

³³ Straus 2006; Guichaoua 2007. ³⁴ Oliner and Oliner 1992.

³⁵ Oliner and Oliner 1992.

For the reader interested in non-violence and local peacebuilding, this book contributes to a more nuanced theoretical reflection and empirical analysis of the phenomenon. Non-violence has emerged as an important research theme in the field of political violence, but its dynamics, limitations, and legacies deserve further research. Moreover, how violence prevention practices impact the civilian population over months and years calls for further critical attention. This book offers a systematic comparative analysis of effective and failed civilian violence prevention efforts in the context of communal war.

Second, most research on collective violence has been state-centric, with a primary focus on civil wars and interstate violence. Yet the consequences of non-state conflict also result in civilian victimization, large-scale displacement, economic devastation, grievous injury, and death.³⁶ Communal violence affects many democratizing states, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa and South/Southeast Asia. It can escalate so dramatically as to reach casualty numbers beyond the yearly civil war threshold only within days of fighting. Despite this intensity of violence, the social processes of escalation, civilian responses, and their legacies for state-building, democratization, and peaceful coexistence have received limited research attention. For the reader interested in communal conflict and political violence research more broadly, this book offers a new conceptualization of large-scale communal violence as warfare ‘from below’, emerging not only from elite manipulation and in the context of elections, but importantly from the mobilization of ordinary people in response to first acts of killings. The book further moves beyond the urban bias of the riot literature and integrates the rural dimension of communal violence into its analysis.

For the reader interested in the dynamics of ‘religious’ conflict, particularly in the context of regime change and democratization, I hope to provide a fresh analysis of the emergence of ‘religious conflict’ narratives and their causal effect on armed group formation and conflict escalation. The risk of mass violence perceived and framed as ‘religious conflict’, and the potential of religious leaders to effectively prevent violence, remain of primary policy concern, as for example the conflict in the Central African Republic reminds us.

Lastly, for the reader interested in resilience research, this book advances the empirical study of social resilience in conflict and

³⁶ Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012.

implications for peacebuilding. Since the World Bank adopted the term in the context of state fragility and conflict prevention, there has been an explosion of resilience-based policy programmes in international security and development. The term ‘resilience’ has come to attract considerable popularity, provoking substantial criticism on its vagueness and potential neo-liberal policy implications.³⁷ There is now a substantial field of critical security and resilience research but careful application of the concept’s core ideas to empirical cases is lacking. This book addresses this gap. It offers an in-depth analysis of how vulnerable communities become resilient. In many war zones, security forces or international peacekeepers often deploy late and in insufficient numbers,³⁸ forcing civilians into self-protection for survival. The book provides a discussion of the normative implications of social resilience, civilian protection, and survival in war zones.

Organization of This Book

The following chapter defines communal war and offers a typology of the patterns of violence in communal conflicts. I distinguish patterns of violence along five dimensions: the geography of violence (urban/rural); the type of conflict (one-sided/dyadic) and of violent incident (pogroms, battles, [joint] attacks, massacres); the categories of armed actors; the national context and the role of the state; and the repertoires of violence employed by armed civilians and reported per incident. This typology supports a more nuanced analysis of civilian mobilization and the organization of violence in communal war, which should inform prevention efforts.

Chapter 2 offers a brief summary of resilience research and introduces the ‘resilience lens’, which directs the analytical focus towards community adaptation and the role of generic social dynamics of social knowledge, learning, scenario-building, and threat anticipation in the context of an adverse environment. I review civil war and genocide research on civilian prevention and self-protection and distinguish two main arguments: the institutional capacity of local communities, which enables resistance to conflict dynamics; and leadership and rescue agency of individuals who act courageously and altruistically to

³⁷ E.g., Norris et al. 2008, p. 125; Chandler 2014.

³⁸ Corbett 2011; Harragin 2011; Williams 2013; Gorur 2013.

prevent killings despite high risks to their lives. I combine both arguments in my theoretical framework of civilian mobilization and non-escalation. Using the resilience lens, the framework shows how individual and collective agency enables community adaptation to mitigate vulnerability and sustain prevention. Chapter 3 offers a discussion of my fieldwork in the context of continuing communal conflicts in Indonesia and Nigeria. It focuses on the research design and process, the context of my interviews and ethnographic observations, and the challenges and limitations of this field research.

Chapter 4 turns to the empirical analysis of communal war in Ambon and Maluku Province, eastern Indonesia. After a brief summary of the conflict, I explain the emergence of communal violence from below and militia formation. The next chapter examines violent and non-violent outcomes in the similarly mixed and contiguous neighbourhoods of Poka–Rumahtiga and Wayame in Ambon. It details how leaders in Wayame established a new social order while in Poka–Rumahtiga, ad hoc prevention efforts failed when, under the influence of refugee populations, some residents started to arm themselves and mobilize for attacks as much as for self-defence. I show how in Wayame, one community leader’s rescue agency enabled collective mobilization that sustained prevention.

Chapters 6 and 7 turn to the analysis of the Jos conflict in Plateau State, central Nigeria. Chapter 6 examines civilian mobilization and conflict escalation in Jos and briefly contrasts these findings to the case study of Ambon. Chapter 7 comparatively analyses violent and non-violent outcomes in the almost contiguous mixed neighbourhoods of Anglo Jos and Dadin Kowa, demonstrating how people in Dadin Kowa mobilized to prevent clashes. Dadin Kowa’s successful prevention work later informed NGO peacebuilding efforts in Jos.

Lastly, my concluding chapter reviews the arguments presented and discusses their implications for researchers and policy makers, and the prospects of resilience building.